Validation is often defined as the process of determining the degree to which a model is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of its intended uses. Validation is crucial as industries and governments depend increasingly on predictions by computer models to justify their decisions. We propose to formulate the validation of a given model as an iterative construction process that mimics the often implicit process occurring in the minds of scientists. We offer a formal representation of the progressive build-up of trust in the model. Thus, we replace static claims on the impossibility of validating a given model by a dynamic process of constructive approximation. This approach is better adapted to the fuzzy, coarsegrained nature of validation. Our procedure factors in the degree of redundancy versus novelty of the experiments used for validation as well as the degree to which the model predicts the observations. We illustrate the methodology first with the maturation of quantum mechanics as the arguably best established physics theory and then with several concrete examples drawn from some of our primary scientific interests: a cellular automaton model for earthquakes, a multifractal random walk model for financial time series, an anomalous diffusion model for solar radiation transport in the cloudy atmosphere, and a computational fluid dynamics code for the Richtmyer-Meshkov instability.
t the heart of the scientific endeavor, model building involves a slow and arduous selection process, which can be roughly represented as proceeding according to the following steps: (i) start from observations and/or experiments; (ii) classify them according to regularities that they may exhibit: the presence of patterns, of some order, also sometimes referred to as structures or symmetries, is begging for ''explanations'' and is thus the nucleation point of modeling; (iii) use inductive reasoning, intuition, analogies, and so on, to build hypotheses from which a model is constructed (by model, we understand an abstract conceptual construction based on axioms and logical relations developed to extract logical propositions and predictions); (iv) test the model obtained in step iii with available observations, and then extract predictions that are tested against new observations or by developing dedicated experiments. The model is then rejected or refined by an iterative process, a loop going from i to iv. A given model is progressively validated by the accumulated confirmations of its predictions by repeated experimental and/or observational tests.
The validation of models is becoming a major issue as humans are increasingly faced with decisions involving complex tradeoffs in problems with large uncertainties, as for instance in attempts to control the growing anthropogenic burden on the planet (1) within a risk-cost framework (2, 3) based on predictions of models. For policy decisions, federal, state, and local governments increasingly depend on computer models that are scrutinized by scientific agencies to attest to their legitimacy and reliability. Cognizance of this trend and its scientific implications is not lost on the engineering (4) and physics (5) communities.
How does one validate a model when it makes predictions on objects that are not fully replicated in the laboratory, either in the range of variables, of parameters or of scales? Indeed, a potentially far-reaching consequence of validation is to give the ''green light'' for extrapolating a body of knowledge, which is firmly established only in some limited ranges of variables, parameters and scales.
Predictive capability is what enables us to go beyond this clearly defined domain into a more fuzzy area of unknown conditions and outcomes. This problem has repeatedly appeared in different guises in practically all scientific fields. A notable domain of application is risk assessment: see for instance the classic paper on risks (6) , and the instructive history of quantitative risk analysis in U.S. regulatory practice (7) , especially in the U.S. nuclear power industry (8) (9) (10) (11) ).
An accute question in risk assessment deals with the question of quantifying the potential for a catastrophic event (earthquake, tornado, hurricane, flood, huge solar mass ejection, large bolide, industrial plant explosion, ecological disaster, financial crash, economic collapse, etc.) of amplitude never yet sampled from the knowledge of past history and present understanding. This is crucial, for example, in the problem of scaling the physics of material and rock rupture tested in the laboratory to the scale of earthquakes. This is necessary for scaling the knowledge of hydrodynamical processes quantified in the laboratory to the length and time scales relevant to the atmospheric/oceanic weather and climate, not to mention astrophysical systems. Perhaps surprisingly, the same problem arises in the evaluation of electronic circuits. The problem is that there is no systematic way to determine the range of applicability of the models provided within circuit simulator component libraries. The example of validation of electronic circuits is particularly interesting because it identifies the origin of the difficulties inherent in validation: the fact that the dynamics are strongly nonlinear and complex with threshold effects, that it does not allow for a simple-minded analytic approach consisting in testing a circuit component by component. This same difficulty is found in validating general circulation models of the Earth's climate or end-to-end computer simulations of complex engineering systems such as an aircraft or a nuclear weapon. The problem is fundamentally due to its systemic nature.
Validation and Hypothesis Testing
We start by recognizing that validation is closely related to hypothesis testing and statistical significance tests of mathematical statistics (12), a point made previously by several others authors (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) . In hypothesis testing, a null H 0 is compared with an alternative hypothesis H 1 , in their ability to explain and fit data. The result of the test is either to ''reject H 0 in favor of H 1 '' or ''not reject H 0 .'' One never concludes ''reject H 1 ,'' or even ''accept H 0 or H 1 .'' If one concludes ''do not reject H 0 ,'' this does not necessarily mean that the null hypothesis is true, it only suggests that there is not sufficient evidence against H 0 in favor of H 1 ; rejecting the null hypothesis may suggest but does not prove that the alternative hypothesis is true, only that it is better given the data. Thus, one can never prove that an hypothesis is true, only that it is less effective in explaining the data than another hypothesis. One can also conclude that an hypothesis H 1 is not necessary and the other more parsimonious hypothesis H 0 should be favored. The alternative hypothesis H 1 is not rejected, strictly speaking, but can be found unnecessary or redundant with respect to H 0 . This is the situation when there are two (or several) alternative hypotheses H 0 and H 1 , which can be composite, nested, or nonnested (the technical difficulties of hypothesis testing depends on these structures of the competing hypotheses; ref. 18 ). This illuminates the status of code comparison in verification and validation (19) . Viewed in this way, it is clear why code comparison alone, i.e., independent of comparison to observations/experiments, is not sufficient for validation because validation requires comparison with experiments and several other steps described below. The analogy with hypothesis testing makes clear that code comparison allows the selection of one code among several codes but does not help to conclude about the validity of a given code or model when considered as a unique entity independently of other codes or models. We should stress that the Sandia report (19) presents an even more negative view of code comparisons because it addresses the common practice in the computer community that turns to code comparisons rather than real verification or validation, without any independent referents. Here, using the analogy with hypothesis testing, we have taken a more positive view of ''Code 1 versus referent compared with Code 2 versus reference,'' leading to an inference about which code is better based on the comparative performance with the data. Although some will consider this as real validation, this procedure does not address the challenges raised earlier, which justifies the algorithm delineated in following sections.
In the theory of hypothesis testing, there is a second class of tests, called ''tests of significance,'' in which one considers a unique hypothesis H 0 (model), and the alternative is ''all of the rest,'' i.e., all hypotheses that differ from H 0 . In that case, the conclusion of a test can be the following: ''this data sample does not contradict the hypothesis H 0 ,'' which is of course not the same as ''the hypothesis H 0 is true.'' In other words, a test of significance cannot ''accept'' an hypothesis, it can only fail to reject it because the hypothesis is found sufficient at some confidence level for explaining the available data. Multiplying the tests will not help in accepting H 0 .
Because validation must at least contain hypothesis testing, this shows that statements like ''verification and validation of numerical models of natural systems is impossible'' (20, 21) are best rephrased in the language of mathematical statistics (12) : the theory of statistical hypothesis testing has taught mathematical and applied statisticians for decades that one can never prove an hypothesis or a model to be true. One can only develop an increasing trust in it by subjecting it to more and more tests that ''do not reject it.'' We attempt to formalize below how such trust can be built up to lead to validation viewed as an evolving process.
Validation as a Constructive Iterative Process
In a standard exercise of model validation, one performs an experiment and, in parallel, runs the calculations with the available model. Then, a comparison between the measurements of the experiment and the outputs of the model calculations is performed. This comparison uses some metrics controlled by experimental feasibility, i.e., what can actually be measured. One then iterates by refining the model until (admittedly subjective) satisfactory agreement is obtained. Then, another set of measurements is performed, which is compared with the corresponding predictions of the model. If the agreement is still satisfactory without modifying the model, this is considered progress in the validation of the model. Iterating with experiments testing different features of the model corresponds to mimicking the process of construction of a theory in physics (22) . As the model is exposed to increasing scrutiny and testing, the testers develop a better understanding of the reliability (and limitations) of the model in predicting the outcome of new experimental and/or observational set-ups. This implies that ''validation activity should be organized like a project, with goals and requirements, a plan, resources, a schedule, and a documented record'' (5).
Extending previous proposals (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) , we thus propose to formulate the validation problem of a given model as an iterative construction that embodies the often implicit process occurring in the minds of scientists:
1. One starts with an a priori trust quantified by the value V prior in the potential value of the model. This quantity captures the accumulated evidence thus far. If the model is new or the validation process is just starting, take V prior ϭ 1. As we will soon see, the absolute value of V prior is unimportant but its relative change is important. 2. An experiment is performed, the model is set up to calculate what should be the outcome of the experiment, and the comparison between these predictions and the actual measurements is made either in model space or in observation space. The comparison requires a choice of metrics. 3. Ideally, the quality of the comparison between predictions and observations is formulated as a statistical test of significance in which an hypothesis (the model) is tested against the alternative, which is ''all of the rest.'' Then, the formulation of the comparison will be either ''the model is rejected'' (it is not compatible with the data) or ''the model is compatible with the data.'' To implement this statistical test, one needs to attribute a likelihood p(M͉y obs ) or, more generally, a metric-based ''grade'' that quantifies the quality of the comparison between the predictions of the model M and observations y obs . This grade is compared with the reference likelihood q of ''all of the rest.'' Examples of implementations include the sign test and the tolerance interval methods. In this respect, refs. 23 and 24 used the mathematical statistics of hypothesis testing as a way to validate for safety problems the correctness of a code simulating the operation of a system with respect to a level of confidence. The main conclusion is that the testing of the input variables separately may lead to incorrect safety-related decisions with unforeseen consequences. They have used two statistical methods: the sign test and the tolerance interval methods for testing more than one mutually dependent output variables. We propose to use these and similar tests delivering a probability level p, which can then be compared with a predefined likelihood level q. In many cases, one does not have the luxury of a likelihood; one has then to resort to more empirical notations of how well the model explains crucial observations. In the most complex cases, these notations can be binary (accepted or rejected). 4. The posterior value of the model is obtained according to a formula of the type
In this expression, V posterior is the posterior potential, or coefficient, of trust in the value of the model after the comparison between the prediction of the model and the new observations have been performed. By the action of F(. . . ), V posterior can be either larger or smaller than V prior : in the former case, the experimental test has increased our trust in the validity of the model; in the later case, the experimental test has signaled problems with the model. One could call V prior and V posterior the evolving ''potential value of our trust'' in the model or, loosely paraphrasing the theory of decision making in economics, the ''utility'' of the model (25) .
The transformation from the potential value V prior of the model before the experimental test to V posterior after the test is embodied into the multiplier F, which can be either Ͼ1 (toward validation) or Ͻ1 (toward invalidation). We postulate that F depends on the grade p(M͉y obs ), to be interpreted as proportional to the probability of the model M given the data y obs . It is natural to compare this probability with the reference likelihood q that one or more of all other conceivable models is compatible with the same data.
The multiplier F depends also on a parameter c novel that quantifies the importance of the test. In other words, c novel is a measure of the impact of the experiment or of the observation, that is, how well the new observation explores novel ''dimensions'' of the parameter and variable spaces of both the process and the model that can reveal potential flaws. A fundamental challenge is that the determination of c novel requires, in some sense, a preexisting understanding of the physical processes so that the value of a new experiment can be fully appreciated. In concrete situations, one has only a limited understanding of the physical processes and the value of a new observation is only assessed after a long learning phase, after comparison with other observations and experiments, as well as after comparison with the model making c novel possibly selfreferencing. Thus, we consider c novel is basically a judgment-based weighting of experimental referents, in which judgment (for example, by a subject matter expert) is dominant in its determination. The fundamental problem is to quantify the relevance of a new experimental referent for validation to a given decision-making problem, given that the experimental domain of the test does not overlap with the application domain of the decision. Assignment of c novel requires the judgment of subject matter experts, whose opinions will likely vary. This variability must be acknowledge (if not accounted for however naively) in assigning c novel . Thus, providing an a priori value for c novel , as required in Eq. 1, remains a difficult and key step in the validation process. This difficulty is similar to specifying the utility function in decision making (25) .
Repeating an experiment twice is a special degenerate case because it amounts ideally to increasing the statistical size of the sample. In such a situation, one should aggregate the two experiments 1 and 2 (yielding the relative likelihoods p 1 /q and p 2 /q respectively) graded with the same c novel into an effective single test with the same c novel and likelihood (p 1 /q)(p 2 /q). This is the ideal situation, as there are cases where repeating an experiment may wildly increase the presence of epistemic uncertainty (or demonstrate uncontrolled variability or other kinds of problems). When this occurs, this means that the assumption that there is no surprise, no novelty, in repeating the experiment is incorrect. Then, the two experiments should be treated so as to contribute two multipliers F's, because they reveal different kinds of uncertainty that can be generated by ensembles of experiments.
One experimental test corresponds to a entire loop 1-4 transforming a given V prior to a V posterior according to Eq. 2. This V posterior becomes the new V prior for the next test, which will transform it into another V posterior and so on, according to the following iteration process
[2]
After n validation loops, we end up with a posterior trust in the model given by
where the product is time-ordered because the sequence of values for c novel (j) depend on preceding tests. Validation can be said to be asymptotically satisfied when the number of steps n and the final value V posterior (n) are sufficiently high. How high is high enough is subjective and may depend on both the application and programmatic constraints. The concrete examples discussed below offer some insight on this issue. This construction makes clear that there is no absolute validation, only a process of corroborating or disproving steps competing in a global valuation of the model under scrutiny. The product 3 expresses the assumption that successive observations give independent multipliers. This assumption keeps the procedure simple because determining the dependence between different tests with respect to validation would be highly undetermined. We propose that it is more convenient to measure the dependence through the single parameter c novel (j) quantifying the novelty of the jth test with respect to those preceding it. In full generality, each new F multiplier should be a function of all previous tests.
The loop 1-4 together with Eq. 4 are offered as an attempt to quantify the progression of the validation process, so that eventually, when several approximately independent tests exploring different features of the model and of the process have been performed, V posterior has grown to a level at which most experts will be satisfied and will believe in the validity of the model. This formulation has the advantage of viewing the validation process as a convergence or divergence built on a succession of steps, mimicking the construction of a theory of reality. It is conceivable that a new and radically different observation/experiment may arise and challenge the built-up trust in a model; such a scenario exemplifies how any notion of validation ''convergence'' is inherently local.
Eq. 3 embodies the progressive build-up of trust in a model or theory. This formulation provides a formal setting for discussing the difficulties that underlie the so-called impossibilities (20, 21, 26) This formulation makes clear why and how one is never fully convinced that validation has been obtained: it is a matter of degree, of confidence level, of decision making, as in statistical testing. However, this formulation helps in quantifying what new confidence (or distrust) is gained in a given model. It emphasizes that validation is an ongoing process, similar to the never-ending construction of a theory of reality.
The general formulation proposed here in terms of iterated validation loops is intimately linked with decision theory based on limited knowledge: the decision to ''go ahead'' and use the model is fundamentally a decision problem based on the accumulated confidence embodied in V posterior . The ''go/no-go'' decision must take into account conflicting requirements and compromise between different objectives. Decision theory, created by the statistician Abraham Wald in the late 1940s, is based ultimately on game theory (25, 27) . Wald (28) used the term ''loss function,'' which is the standard terminology used in mathematical statistics. In mathematical economics, the opposite of the loss (or cost) function gives the concept of the utility function, which quantifies (in a specific functional form) what is considered important and robust in the fit of the model to the data. We use V posterior in an even more general sense than ''utility,'' as a decision-and information-based valuation that supports risk-informed decision-making based on ''satisficing'' (see the concrete examples discussed below). In economics, ''satisficing'' is a behavior that attempts to achieve at least some minimum level of a particular variable, but does not strive to achieve its maximum possible value. The word satisfice was introduced by H. Simon in his theory of bounded rationality.
Although Eq. 1 is reminiscent of a Bayesian analysis, it does not deal with probabilities. In the Bayesian methodology of validation (29, 30) , only comparison between models can be performed due to the need to remove the unknown probability of the data in Bayes's formula. In contrast, our approach provides a value for each single model independently of the others. In addition, it emphasizes the importance of quantifying the novelty of each test and takes a more general view on how to use the information provided from the goodness-of-fit. The valuation (1) of a model uses probabilities as partial inputs, not as the qualifying criteria for model validation. This does not mean, however, that there are not uncertainties in these quantities or in the terms F, q, or c novel and that aleatory and systemic uncertainties are ignored, as discussed below. For some in-depth discussion on aleatory versus systemic uncertainties, see ref. 31 .
Properties of the Multiplier of the Validation Step
The multiplier F[p(M͉y obs ), q; c novel ] should have the following properties:
1. If the statistical test(s) performed on the given observations is (are) passed at the reference level q, then the posterior potential value is larger than the prior potential value: F Ͼ 1 (resp. F Յ1) for p Ͼ q (resp. p Յ q), which can be written succinctly as lnF/ln(p/q) Ͼ 0. 2. The larger the statistical significance of the passed test, the larger the posterior value. Hence,
for a given q. There could be a saturation of the growth of F for large p/q, which can be either that F Ͻ ϱ as p/q 3 ϱ or of the form of a concavity requirement Ѩ 2 F/Ѩp 2 Ͻ 0 for large p/q: obtaining a quality of fit beyond a certain level should not be attempted.
3. The larger the statistical level at which the test(s) performed on the given observations is (are) passed, the larger the impact of a ''novel'' experiment on the multiplier enhancing the prior into the posterior potential value of the model: ѨF/Ѩc novel Ͼ 0 (resp. Յ 0), for p Ͼ q (resp. p Յ q).
The simplest form obeying these properties (not including the saturation of the growth of F) is
This form provides an intuitive interpretation of the meaning of the experiment impact parameter c novel . A bland evaluation of the novelty of a test would be c novel ϭ 1, thus F ϭ p/q and the chain (3) reduces to a product of normalized likelihoods, as in standard statistical tests. A value c novel Ͼ 1 (resp. Ͻ 1) for a given experiment describes a nonlinear rapid (resp. slow) updating of our trust V as a function of the grade p/q of the model with respect to the observations. In particular, a large value of c novel corresponds to the case of ''critical'' tests. A famous example is the Michelson-Morley experiment for the Theory of Special Relativity. For the Theory of General Relativity, it was the observation during the 1919 solar eclipse of the bending of light rays from distant stars by the Sun's mass and the anomalous precession of the perihelion of Mercury's orbit.
Note that the parameterization (Eq. 5) should account for the decreased novelty noted above occurring when the same experiment is repeated two or more times. The value of c novel should be reduced for each repetition of the same test; moreover, the value of c novel should approach unity as the number of repetitions increases.
The alternative multiplier,
is plotted in Fig. 1 4 , i.e., V posterior /V prior is only determined by the quality of the ''fit'' of the data by the model quantified by p/q. A finite c novel implies that one already takes a restrained view on the usefulness of the experiment because one limits the amplitude of the gain ϭ V posterior /V prior , whatever the quality of the fit of the data by the model. The exponent 4 in Eq. 5 has been chosen so that the maximum confidence gain F is equal to 1/(tanh (1)) 4 Ϸ 3 in the best possible situation of a completely new experiment (c novel ϭ ϱ) and perfect fit (p/q 3 ϱ). In contrast, the multiplier F can be arbitrarily small as p/q 3 0 even if the novelty of the test is high (c novel 3 ϱ). For a finite novelty c novel , a test that fails the model miserably (p/q Ϸ 0) does not necessarily reject the model completely: unlike with the expression in Eq. 5, F remains greater than zero. Indeed, if the novelty c novel is small, the worst-case multiplier (attained for p/q ϭ 0) is [tanh(1/c novel )/tanh(1 ϩ (/1/c novel ))] 4 Ϸ 1 Ϫ 6.9e Ϫ2/cnovel , which is only slightly less than unity if c novel Ͻ Ͻ 1. In short, this formulation does not heavily weight unimportant tests.
In the framework of decision theory, Eq. 1 with one of the specific expressions in Eqs. 5 or 6 provides a parametric form for the utility or decision ''function'' of the decision maker. It is clear that many other forms of the utility function can be used, however, with the constraint of keeping the salient features of Eq. 1 with Eq. 5 or 6, in terms of the impact of a new test given past tests, and the quality of the comparison between the model predictions and the data.
The proposed form for the multiplier (Eq. 6) contains an important asymmetry between gains and losses: the failure to a single test with strong novelty and significance (as, e.g., for the localized seismicity on faults in the case of the OFC model and for the leverage effect in the case of the MRW model discussed below) cannot be compensated by the success of all of the other tests combined. In other words, a single test is enough to reject a model. This embodies the common lore that reputation gain is a slow process requiring constancy and tenacity, although its loss can occur suddenly with one single failure and is difficult to reestablish. We believe that the same applies to the build-up of trust in and, thus, validation of a model. These two crucial elements of a validation step are conditioned by four basic problems, over which one can exert at least partial control: (i) How to model? (ii) How to measure? (iii) What to measure? (iv) How to interpret the results? In particular, they address the two sources of uncertainty: epistemic (lack of knowledge, important missing mechanisms) and aleatory (31) (due to variability inherent in the phenomenon under consideration). In a nutshell, as becomes clearer below, the comparison between p and q is more concerned with the aleatory uncertainty, whereas c novel deals in part with the systemic uncertainty. In the following, as in Eqs. 5 and 6, we consider that p and q enter only in the form of their ratio p/q. This should not be generally the case, but given the many uncertainties, this restriction seems to simplify the analysis by removing a degree of freedom.
We now illustrate our algorithmic approach to model validation by using the historical development of quantum mechanics and four examples based on the authors' research activities. In these examples, we will use the form (6) and consider three finite values: c novel ϭ 1 (marginally useful new test), c novel ϭ 10 (substantially new test), and c novel ϭ 100 (important new test). When a likelihood test is not available, we propose to use three possible marks: p/q ϭ 0.1 (poor fit), p/q ϭ 1 (marginally good fit), and p/q ϭ 10 (good fit). Extreme values (c novel or p/q are 0 or ϱ) have already been discussed. Due to limited experience with this approach, we propose these ad hoc values in the following examples of its application.
Quantum Mechanics
Quantum mechanics offer a vivid incarnation of how a model can turn progressively into a theory held ''true'' by almost all physicists. For details on how validation of quantum mechanics is characterized within our procedure, see supporting information (SI) Appendix and http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0511219.
Four Further Examples Drawn from the Authors' Research Activities
The Olami-Feder-Christensen (OFC) Sand-Pile Model of Earthquakes. This is perhaps the simplest sand-pile model of self-organized criticality, which exhibits a phenomenology resembling real seismicity (32) . To validate the OFC model, we examine the properties and prediction of the model that can be compared with real seismicity, together with our assessment of their c novel and qualityof-fit. We are careful to state these properties in an ordered way, as specified in the above sequences ( Eqs. 2 and 3) . For a detailed account of the implementation of our procedure, see SI Appendix and http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0511219.
The Multifractal Random Walk (MRW) as a Model of Financial Returns.
The MRW was introduced as a model of financial time series and consists in a random walk with stochastic ''volatility'' endowed with exact multifractal properties (33, 34) . Among the documented facts about financial time series, let us quote the absence of correlation between lagged returns, the long-range correlation of lagged volatilities, and the observed multifractality. These cannot be taken as validation tests of the model because they are the observations that motivated the introduction of the MRW. These observations thus constitute references or benchmarks against which new tests must be compared. The new properties and prediction of the MRW model that can be compared with real financial return time series are described in SI Appendix and http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/ 0511219.
An Anomalous Diffusion Model for Solar Photons in Cloudy Atmospheres.
We have also applied our validation method to the radiative transfer model developed in refs. [35] [36] [37] . This model describes the paths of solar photons at nonabsorbing wavelengths in the cloudy atmosphere in terms of convoluted Lévy walks (38) , which are characterized by frequent small steps (inside clouds) and occasional large jumps (typically between clouds). See SI Appendix and http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0511219.
A Computational Fluid Dynamics Model for Shock-Induced Mixing and
Shock-Tube Tests. So far, our examples of models for complex phenomena have hailed from quantum and statistical physics. In the latter case, they are stochastic models composed of: (i) simple code (hence rather trivial verification procedures) to generate realizations, and (ii) analytical expressions for the ensemble-average properties (that are used in the above validation exercises). We now turn to the only example treated in details here, which involves gas dynamics codes with broad ranges of applications, from astrophysical and geophysical flow simulation to the design and performance analysis of engineering systems. Specifically, we discuss the validation of the ''Cuervo'' code developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (39) . This software, which generates solutions of the compressive Euler equations, have been verified against a suite of test problems having closed-form solutions; as clearly pointed out by Oberkampf and Trucano (40) , however, this differs from and also does not guarantee validation against experimental data. A standard test case involves the Richtmyer-Meshkov (RM) instability (41, 42) , which arises when a density gradient in a fluid is subjected to an impulsive acceleration, e.g., due to passage of a shock wave (see SI Appendix and http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/ 0511219). Evolution of the RM instability is nonlinear and hydrodynamically complex, and hence defines an excellent problem space to assess computational fluid dynamics code performance.
In the series of shock-tube experiments described in ref. 43 , RM dynamics are realized by preparing one or more cylinders with approximately identical axisymmetric Gaussian concentration profiles of dense sulfur hexaflouride (SF 6 ) in air. This (or these) vertical ''gas cylinder(s)'' is (are) subjected to a weak shock (Mach number Ϸ1.2) propagating horizontally. The ensuing dynamics are largely governed by the mismatch of the density gradient between the gases (with the density of SF 6 approximately five times that of air) and the pressure gradient through the shock wave; this mismatch acts as the source for baroclinic vorticity generation. The visualization of the density field is obtained by using a planar laser-induced fluorescence (PLIF) technique, which provides high-resolution quantitative concentration measurements. The velocity field is diagnosed by using particle image velocimetry (PIV), based on correlation measurements of small-scale particles that are lightly seeded in the initial flow field. Careful postprocessing of images from 130 to 1,000 s after shock passage yields planar concentration and velocity with error bars.
1. The RM flow is dominated at early times by a vortex pair (per gas cylinder). Later, secondary instabilities rapidly transition the flow to a mixed state. We rate c novel ϭ 10 for the observations of these two instabilities. The Cuervo code correctly captures these two instabilities, best observed and modeled with a single cylinder. At this qualitative level, we rate p/q ϭ 10 (good fit), which leads to F (1) ϭ 2.4. 2. Older data for two-cylinder experiments acquired with a fogbased technique (rather than PLIF) showed two separated spirals associated with the primary instability, but the Cuervo code predicted the existence of a material bridge. This previously unobserved connection was experimentally diagnosed with the improved observational technique. Using c novel ϭ 10 and p/q ϭ 10 yields F (2) ϭ 2.4. 3. The evolution of the total power as a function of time offers another useful metric. The numerical simulation quantitatively accounts for the exponential growth of the power with time, within the experimental error bars. Using c novel ϭ 10 and p/q ϭ 10 yields F (3) ϭ 2.4. 4. The concentration power spectrum as a function of wavenumber for different times provides another way (in the Fourier domain) to present the information of the hierarchy of structures already visualized in physical space (c novel ϭ 1). The Cuervo code correctly accounts for the low wavenumber part of the spectrum but underestimates the high wavenumber part (beyond the deterministic-stochastic transition wavenumber) by a factor of 2-5. We capture this by setting p/q ϭ 0.1, which yields F (4) ϭ 0.47.
Combining the multipliers according to Eq. 3 leads to V posterior
/ V prior (1) ϭ 6.5, a significant gain, but still not sufficient to compellingly validate the Cuervo code for inviscid shock-induced hydrodynamic instability simulations. Intricate experiments with three gas cylinders have been performed (44) , and others are currently under way to further stress computational fluid dynamics models.
These examples illustrate the utility of representing the validation process as a succession of steps, each of them characterized by the two parameters c novel and p/q. The determination of c novel requires expert judgment and that of p/q a careful statistical analysis, which is beyond the scope of the present report (see ref. 45 for a detailed case study). The parameter q is ideally imposed as a confidence level, say 95% or 99%, as in standard statistical tests. In practice, it may depend on the experimental test and requires a case-by-case examination.
The uncertainties of c novel and of p/q need to be assessed. Indeed, different statistical estimations or metrics may yield different p/q's and different experts will likely rate differently the novelty c novel of a new test. As a result, the trust gain V posterior (n ϩ 1) /V prior (1) after n tests necessarily has a range of possible values that grows geometrically with n. In certain cases, a drastic difference can be obtained by a change of c novel : for instance, if instead of attributing c novel ϭ 100 to the sixth OFC test, we put c novel ϭ 10 (resp. 1) while keeping p/q ϭ 0.1, F (6) is changed from 4 ϫ 10 Ϫ4 to 4 ϫ 10 Ϫ3 (resp. 0.47). The trust gain then becomes V posterior (7) /V prior (1) ϭ 0.07 (resp. Ӎ 9). For the sixth OFC test, c novel ϭ 1 is arguably unrealistic, given the importance of faults in seismology. The two possible choices c novel ϭ 100 and c novel ϭ 10 then give similar conclusions on the invalidation of the OFC model. In our examples, V posterior (n ϩ 1) /V prior (1) provides a qualitatively robust measure of the gain in trust after n steps; this robustness has been built-in by imposing a coarse-grained quality to p/q and c novel .
Summary
We have proposed an iterative, constructive approach to validation using quantitative measures and expert knowledge to assess the relative state of validation of a model instantiated in a computer code. In this approach, the increase/decrease in validation is mediated through a function that incorporates the results of the model vis-à-vis the experiment together with a measure of the impact of that experiment on the validation process. Although this function is not uniquely specified, it is not arbitrary: certain asymptotic trends, consistent with heuristically plausible behavior, must be observed. In five fundamentally different examples, we have illustrated how this approach might apply to a validation process for physics or engineering models. We believe that the multiplicative decomposition of trust gains or losses (given in Eq.
3), using a suitable functional prescription (such as Eq. 6), provides a reasoned and principled description of the key elements, and fundamental limitations, of validation. It should be equally applicable to biological and social sciences, especially because it is built upon the decision-making processes of the latter. We believe that our procedure transforms the paralyzing criticisms in Popper's style that ''we cannot validate, we can only invalidate'' (20, 21) , espoused for instance by Konikov and Bredehoeft in the context of groundwater models (46) , into a practical constructive algorithm that addresses specifically both problems of distinguishing between competing models and transforming the vicious circle of lack of suitable data into a virtuous circle quantifying the evolving trust of a model based on the novelty and relevance of new data and the quality of fits.
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